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HABEAS AS FORUM ALLOCATION:
A NEW SYNTHESIS
Carlos M. Vázquez*
The scope of habeas relief for state prisoners, especially during the decades
before the Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in Brown v. Allen, is a famously
disputed question – one of recognized significance for contemporary debates
about the proper scope of habeas review. This Essay provides a new answer.
It argues that, until the enactment of AEDPA in 1996, state prisoners were
always entitled to de novo review of the legal and mixed law/fact questions
decided against them by the state courts. Until 1916, such review was
provided by the Supreme Court; after 1953, such review was provided by the
lower federal courts via habeas. The situation between 1916 and 1953 was
murkier. This Essay shows that this was a transitional period marked by
disagreement among the Justices as to the appropriate federal forum to review
state court decisions resulting in custody. At the beginning of this period, a
majority of Justices continued to insist that the responsibility rested with
Supreme Court. Towards the end of this period, the Court shifted this
responsibility to the habeas courts as a majority of Justices came to recognize
that the Court could no longer hope to monitor state court criminal convictions.
The Justices during this period agreed that federal review of state court
convictions was necessary but disagreed about which federal court should
provide such review. The scope of habeas jurisdiction during this period, as
before and after, reflected the Justices’ views about the proper allocation of
jurisdiction among federal courts to review the state courts’ decision of
constitutional questions arising in criminal cases resulting in custody.
In Brown v. Allen, decided in 1953, the Supreme Court held that
federal courts adjudicating the habeas petitions of persons convicted of
crimes in state court should apply a de novo standard of review with
respect to issues of law and of application of law to fact.1 This standard
of review prevailed until the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor
interpreted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for helpful
comments from Ruthanne Deutsch, Stephen Goldblatt, Tara Leigh Grove, Vicki Jackson,
Victoria Nourse, Michael Seidman, and Mark Tushnet. I am also grateful for research
assistance from Daniel Emam and Dani Zylberberg, and to Thanh Nguyen and his
colleagues at Georgetown’s Edward Bennett Williams Law Library for the research
reflected in the Appendix.
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344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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(AEDPA) as establishing a standard of review more deferential to state
courts.2 Whether Brown’s de novo standard was a departure from the
standard the courts had previously applied in habeas cases is a famously
disputed question. In an influential article, Professor Paul Bator argued
that the Court in Brown broadly expanded the availability of habeas relief
to state prisoners, an expansion that he criticized as undesirable as well as
unprecedented.3 Before Brown, he argued, the federal courts properly
declined to grant habeas relief to state prisoners unless the state court had
failed to provide a full and fair hearing of the petitioner’s constitutional
claim.4 In Professor Bator’s view, the limited scope of federal habeas
review meant that the state courts often had the final word regarding the
federal constitutional rights implicated in state criminal proceedings. This
view was disputed by Justice Brennan, who, in Fay v. Noia, maintained
that habeas courts had always provided plenary review of state prisoners'
fundamental rights.5 Justice Brennan’s version of the history was
defended at some length by Professor Gary Peller.6
More recently, Professor James Liebman has offered a third version
of the pre-Brown history, arguing that both Professor Bator, on the one
hand, and Justice Brennan and Professor Peller, on the other hand, had
gotten parts of the history wrong. According to Professor Liebman, the
habeas statutes always authorized de novo review of constitutional issues
decided by the state courts, but only “where the writ is the only effective
means of preserving [the petitioner’s] rights.”7 During the Nineteenth
Century, habeas was almost never necessary for this purpose, as any
person convicted in the state courts had a right to Supreme Court review
of any federal questions decided against her by the state courts. When
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction became discretionary, however,
the lower federal court’s habeas jurisdiction expanded to fill the gap, the
writ then being the only effective means of preserving the constitutional
rights of state prisoners.8 In Professor Liebman’s telling, federal review
2 529 U.S. 362 (2000). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
3 Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REV. 441, 499–507 (1963).
4

Id. at 463–64.

5

372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963).

Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
579 (1982).
6

7 James Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: the Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct
Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2055 (1992) (quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S.
101, 105 (1942)).
8

See id. at 2075.
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of state court criminal convictions was always available, but the forum
responsible for providing such review shifted in the early part of the
Twentieth Century.
Although Professor Liebman did not use the term, he argued
essentially that the Court’s rules addressing the scope of habeas review
served a forum-allocation function: they allocated among federal courts
the responsibility for monitoring the state courts’ protection of the
constitutional rights of state criminal defendants.9 Before the shift, the
Supreme Court was responsible for providing such review; afterwards, the
lower federal courts were responsible for doing so. At no point were
state prisoners’ constitutional rights relegated to the state courts without
de novo federal review, as Professor Bator had argued.10
This Essay offers a fourth version of the pre-Brown history, bridging
in some respects the other contending versions. The pre-Brown cases
show that Professor Liebman is right about the reason for the Twentieth
Century expansion of the availability of habeas review for state prisoners.
De novo federal court review of state criminal convictions was available
throughout the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Until 1916, state
prisoners (like all state court litigants) had a right to review in the U.S.
Supreme Court of any federal issue decided against them. Before 1867,
the federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction generally did not even extend to
state prisoners. After that date, the Court articulated and enforced a rule
under which the habeas courts were generally to deny relief to state
prisoners convicted of crimes in state courts, the rationale being that
direct review in the Supreme Court was available as of right and should
ordinarily be pursued. Professor Liebman is correct to note that the rule
requiring federal habeas courts to stay their hands fell away in direct

9 All rules of federal jurisdiction are "forum allocating" in the sense that they distribute
judicial power between federal and state courts. I use the term to describe the distribution
of judicial power among federal courts. This sense of the term can be traced to Vicki C.
Jackson’s thesis that the Eleventh Amendment serves a forum-allocation function by
allocating the power to enforce the federal obligations of the states between the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L.J. 1, 14–15, 74 (1988). The Supreme
Court rejected the forum allocation understanding of the Eleventh Amendment in Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process,
and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927 (2000); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh
Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L. J. 1683 (1997).
10 Liebman, supra note 7, at 2080 (“[F]ollowing the certiorarification of the Court's
direct appellate docket, the Court's inability to satisfy by itself the federal courts' statutory
obligation to conduct review as of right, according to those principles, of the
constitutionality of state detention thrust the obligation on the lower federal courts on
habeas corpus.”).
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response to the Supreme Court’s renunciation of the error-correction role
it had previously fulfilled.
But Professor Bator is closer to being right regarding the timing of the
expansion of habeas jurisdiction. Professor Liebman dates the shift from
direct review in the Supreme Court to de novo review in the habeas
courts to the Court’s 1915 decision in Frank v. Magnum. Although the
first statute replacing (some of) the Court’s mandatory writ of error
review with discretionary writ of certiorari review was enacted in 1916,
Professor Liebman argues that Frank responded to an unofficial
“certiorarification” of direct review that preceded the formal
certiorarification beginning in 1916.
But the pre-Brown cases tell a somewhat different story. Well after the
1916 amendments to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the
Court continued to recite and apply the restrictive standards it had
applied before the amendments. As I show in this Essay, the cases show
that, long after the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over state court
judgments became formally discretionary, the Court continued to regard
itself as the appropriate forum for review state criminal convictions. It
realized only gradually that it could not hope to perform an errorcorrection function, and only then did it finally abandon the pre-1916
limits on habeas review of state criminal convictions.
In particular, this Essay shows that the years between 1916 and 1953
were a transitional period characterized by disagreement among the
Justices about the appropriate scope of habeas review. The Justices
agreed that meaningful federal review of state criminal convictions was
necessary, but they disagreed about whether such review should take
place in the Supreme Court on direct review or in the lower federal courts
via habeas corpus. Some Justices believed strongly that, in the absence
of exceptional circumstances, only the Supreme Court should undertake
the sensitive task of reviewing state court convictions and potentially
setting free a person whose conviction had been upheld by the highest
state court. In the view of these Justices, the Court should continue to
perform an error correction function in exercising its discretionary
certiorari jurisdiction over state criminal convictions. Other Justices
believed that the lower federal courts were better situated to perform
such review via habeas corpus. The latter view gradually came to prevail
as the Justices came to realize that they could no longer feasibly fulfill an
error-correction function. Brown v. Allen confirmed this shift in 1953 by
holding both that the habeas courts should no longer regard a denial of
certiorari as reflecting the Court's views on the merits of a state criminal
defendant’s legal claims and that the habeas courts should review
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo.
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In sum, although the cases tend to support Professor Bator’s story
insofar as the timing of the expansion of habeas review is concerned, they
also show that he was wrong about the reason for the restricted
availability of habeas relief in the decades before the Brown decision. At
no point did the Court relegate state prisoners to the state courts for the
protection of their constitutional rights. The need for broad federal
review of state criminal convictions was recognized throughout. The
narrow scope of review in the decades after 1916 was based on the
Court’s continuing conviction that, despite the newly discretionary nature
of its appellate jurisdiction, it alone should be the federal forum reviewing
and possibly reversing state criminal convictions. The loosening of the
restrictions on the lower courts’ exercise of their habeas jurisdiction was
based on the Court’s gradual realization that it could no longer hope to
monitor state court decisions resulting in custody. This realization led the
Court to conclude that the writ of habeas corpus was the only effective
means of preserving the constitutional rights of state prisoners. Although
some pre-Brown cases included language or reasoning foreshadowing the
shift, the first clear articulation of the de novo standard came in Brown v.
Allen.
The pre-Brown history of habeas corpus has potentially important
implications for current debates about the scope of habeas relief for state
prisoners. In Wright v. West, Justice Thomas relied on Professor Bator’s
claim that Brown’s standard was aberrational in urging a return to a more
deferential standard.11 Justice O’Connor, for her part, relied on Justice
Brennan’s history in arguing that any change in the standard should come
from Congress.12 The new understanding of the pre-Brown defended here
exposes as unprecedented Justice Thomas’ proposal to narrow the scope
of habeas review without correspondingly broadening the availability of
direct review in the Supreme Court.
In enacting AEDPA in 1996, Congress amended the statute
governing habeas relief for state prisoners, and a slim majority of the
Court in Williams v. Taylor held that Congress had adopted Justice
Thomas’ deferential habeas standard.13 Specifically, the Court held that, if
the prisoner’s federal claim had been adjudicated on the merits in the
state courts, the habeas court may not grant relief merely because the
state court’s decision was erroneous; it may grant relief only if the state
court’s error was unreasonable.14 In other words, AEDPA (as interpreted
11

505 U.S. 277, 285–87 & n.3 (1992).

12

Id. at 297–299 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

13

529 U.S. 362, 410–11 (2000).

14 Id. at 412–13. For elaboration, see Carlos M. Vázquez, AEDPA as (Dysfunctional)
Forum-Allocation Rule (on file with author).
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in Williams) replaces the de novo standard of review with a standard
requiring the habeas courts to deny relief to state prisoners in custody
pursuant to wrong but reasonable state court decisions. If so, then
AEDPA consigns erroneously convicted state prisoners to continued
imprisonment (or even execution).
The long history of treating habeas as a forum allocation device– as
detailed in this Essay – suggests an alternative understanding of AEDPA.
AEDPA does not limit the Supreme Court’s power to review and reverse
wrong but reasonable state court decisions resulting in custody. Indeed,
the statute’s sponsors believed that Congress lacked the constitutional
power to limit the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state
criminal convictions.15 The Court’s long-standing treatment of habeas
and direct review as alternative mechanisms for providing the necessary
federal review of state criminal convictions invites an interpretation of
AEDPA as shifting back to the Supreme Court the responsibility for
monitoring state court decisions and granting relief for wrong but
reasonable state court convictions.
At the same time, the Court’s reasons for shifting the responsibility
for monitoring state court convictions to the lower federal courts exposes
the highly dysfunctional nature of AEDPA if understood as a forumallocation device. The reasons that drove that shift are just as applicable
today as they were in 1953. The Court is in no better position to fulfill an
error-correction role with respect to state criminal convictions today than
it was then. If anything, allocating such a role to the Supreme Court
would be even more dysfunctional today than it was in 1953.
I develop and critique the forum-allocation reading of AEDPA
elsewhere.16 This Essay details the long history of treating habeas for
state prisoners as allocating among the federal courts the power and
responsibility for safeguarding the constitutional rights of persons
convicted of crimes in state court. I show that, before Williams, de novo
federal review of legal and mixed questions decided by the state courts in
cases resulting in custody was always understood to be necessary and that,
between 1916 and 1953, the debate was not about whether state
prisoners' constitutional claims should be relegated to state court; it was
instead about whether federal review should be undertaken in the
Supreme Court or the lower federal courts. The Court eventually
concluded that it could not hope to monitor state court compliance with
the constitutional rights of state court criminal defendants and
accordingly expanded the lower federal courts’ power to do so via habeas.

15

141 CONG. REC. S7833 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).

16

See Vázquez, supra note 14.
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In Part I, I examine the period between the Founding and 1916,
when Congress amended the statute governing the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction over cases from the state courts, replacing its mandatory writ
of error jurisdiction with discretionary writ of certiorari jurisdiction.
Until 1867, the habeas jurisdiction of the lower federal courts did not
generally extend to state prisoners. During this period, state prisoners
were entitled to de novo review in the Supreme Court of legal and mixed
questions of federal law decided against them in the state courts. Even
after Congress extended the lower federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction to
state prisoners, the Court interpreted the jurisdiction narrowly, channeling
such cases to the Supreme Court. During this period, the Court regarded
direct review as the proper mechanism for ensuring state court protection
of the constitutional rights of persons convicted of crimes in state court.
In Part II, the heart of the Essay, I examine the period between 1916
and the Court’s 1953 decision in Brown v. Allen. I show in this Part that
this was a transitional one marked by disagreement among the Justices
about whether the responsibility for monitoring state court decisions
resulting in custody should be allocated to the Court itself or to the lower
federal courts on habeas. The evolution of the Justices’ views on this
question is reflected mainly in the decisions that gradually rejected the
doctrine that a prior denial of certiorari should be understood to reflect
the Justices’ views on the merits of the legal claims raised in the habeas
petition. It is no accident that Brown v. Allen, the decision that all
recognize as adopting a de novo standard of review of legal and mixed
questions on habeas, was also the decision that made clear that a prior
denial of certiorari deserved no weight in the habeas calculus. The close
link the Court perceived between the two issues reflects the Court’s
understanding of the forum-allocation function of habeas jurisdiction.
In Part III, I show that the Court continued to adhere to the de novo
standard of review until the enactment of AEDPA in 1996. I review
some of the limitations on habeas adopted by the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts and show that, notwithstanding these limitations, the Court
continued to recognize that federal review of state court decisions
resulting in custody was necessary to ensure that the state courts “toe[d]
the constitutional mark.”17 If the Court continues to believe this, and if
AEDPA bars the courts from granting habeas relief for some
constitutional errors that otherwise would warrant reversal of the
conviction, then the Court will need to rethink its current approach to
granting direct review to state prisoners alleging constitutional violations.
I.

THE 1789-1916 PERIOD

17 Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 653 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)).
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From the beginning of our history until after the Civil War, the
federal courts generally lacked jurisdiction to grants writs of habeas
corpus to persons in state custody. After the Civil War, the habeas
jurisdiction of the federal courts was extended to persons in state custody,
but, as discussed below, the Court articulated and enforced extra-statutory
rules according to which the federal courts were ordinarily to deny relief
to persons who were being criminally tried or had been convicted in the
state courts. Nevertheless, during this entire period, state prisoners had a
right of access to the federal courts for de novo review of questions of
federal law and of application of such law to fact. State prisoners had
access to the U.S. Supreme Court, whose jurisdiction over federal
questions decided in the state courts against a federal right-holder was
mandatory. The extra-statutory limits on the lower federal courts’ habeas
jurisdiction were justified by the Court on forum-allocation grounds: the
proper forum for reviewing state criminal convictions was the Supreme
Court on direct review, not the lower federal courts on collateral review.
The Founders agreed that the Constitution should provide for federal
courts in order to ensure state compliance with federal law and to protect
federal rights. Some believed that the Constitution should establish
federal courts to adjudicate federal law in the first instance. Others
believed that it would be sufficient to provide for Supreme Court review
of state court decisions regarding federal law. As a result of the wellknown Madisonian Compromise, the Constitution created a Supreme
Court and provided for Supreme Court review of state courts decisions
on federal questions while empowering Congress to create lower federal
courts to hear federal claims in the first instance if it believed such courts
to be desirable.18 The Constitution’s default mechanism for monitoring
state court enforcement of federal law was thus Supreme Court review of
state courts decisions on federal questions.
The Constitution gave Congress the power to make exceptions to the
Supreme Courts jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Judiciary Act of 1789
provided for mandatory Supreme Court review by writ of error of state
court decisions in which an asserted federal right or privilege had been
denied.19 Thus, from the beginning, persons convicted of a crime in state
court – like all litigants in the state courts – had a right to Supreme Court
review of any federal claims or defenses they had raised that the state
court had denied.20
18 For the propositions in this paragraph, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 18-19 (7th ed. 2015).
19

The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25.

20 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821) (holding that Supreme Court review
of such cases does not violate the Eleventh Amendment).
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Congress did not grant to the federal courts a general authority to
grant habeas relief to state prisoners until after the Civil War.21 The
Judiciary Act of 1789 provided “[t]hat writs of habeas corpus shall in no
case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under
or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for
trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into
court to testify.”22 As a result of this proviso, the federal courts were
empowered to grant habeas relief only to federal prisoners.23 The
Judiciary Act of 1789 entitled persons convicted of crimes in state court
to federal review of their convictions, but allocated the responsibility of
performing such review to the Supreme Court rather than the lower
federal courts.
In 1867, Congress amended the Judiciary Act to authorize habeas
relief "in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty
in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of the United
States."24 The amendment thus conferred jurisdiction on the federal
courts to grant habeas relief to persons in either state or federal custody.
The Supreme Court did not have occasion to interpret this provision until
1885, however, as Congress famously repealed the section of the Act
authorizing appeals to the Supreme Court of the lower federal courts’
decisions under this Act.25
In Ex parte Royall, the first case to address the availability of federal
habeas relief for state prisoners after Congress restored the Court’s
jurisdiction over such appeals, the Court addressed the relation between
the lower federal courts’ jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions by
persons in state custody and the Supreme Court’s obligation to review
federal questions arising in state court through writ of error.26 Royall is
best known for articulating what has since become known as the rule of
exhaustion of state remedies.27 The Court in Royall confirmed that the
21 Pursuant to amendments enacted in 1833 and 1842, the federal courts did have the
authority to grant habeas relief (a) to persons in state or federal custody “for any act done
or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of any order, process, or decree
of any judge or court of the United States,” and (b) to “subjects or citizens of foreign
states, in custody under national or state authority for acts done or omitted by or under
color of foreign authority, and alleged to be valid under the law of nations.”
22

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14.

23 The federal courts could only issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum on behalf of
persons in state custody.
24

The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).

25

The Court upheld this repeal in Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).

26

Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).

27

On this rule, see generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 1349-55.
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federal courts have the power under the 1867 statutes to grant habeas
relief to persons in state custody who are restrained of their liberty in
violation of the Constitution, but went on to hold that the courts have
discretion as to the time and mode of exercising this power. “That
discretion,” the Court held, “should be exercised in the light of the
relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial
tribunals of the Union and of the states, and in recognition of the fact
that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by
unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect
rights secured by the constitution.”28 According to the Court, the federal
courts should grant the writ immediately in “cases of urgency,” such as
those “involving the authority and operations of the general government,
the obligations of this country to or its relations with foreign nations.”29
But, in the absence of “special circumstances requiring immediate
action,” the court has discretion to remit the petitioner to the state courts,
which have an equal obligation to give effect to federal constitutional
rights.30 What the Court in Royall held to be within the courts’ discretion
morphed in later cases into a requirement to exhaust state court remedies,
which today is a statutory requirement.31
After state remedies have been exhausted, the Court in Royall went on
to state, the habeas court “has still a discretion whether, under all the
circumstances then existing, the accused, if convicted, shall be put to his
writ of error from the highest court of the State, or whether it will
proceed, by writ of habeas corpus, summarily to determine whether the
petitioner is restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the
United States.”32 Again, however, what in Royall was left largely to the
lower federal court’s discretion morphed into a stricter requirement in
later cases. As the Court put it in Ex parte Frederich, “the general rule, and
better practice, in the absence of special facts and circumstances, is to
require a prisoner who claims that the judgment of a state court violates
his rights under the constitution or laws of the United States to seek a
review thereof by writ of error, instead of resorting to the writ of habeas
corpus.”33
28

Royall, 117 U.S. at 251.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 253.

31

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).

32

117 U.S. at 253.

33 Ex parte Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 78 (1893). See also Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 290-91
(1898); Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 242 (1896); Ex parte Fonda, 117 U. S. 516
(1886); Duncan v. McCall, 139 U. S. 449 (1891); Wood v. Brush, 140 U. S. 278 (1891);
Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U. S. 291(1891); Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183(1892); New York v.
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In Royall, the Court cited Ex parte Bridges as a case in which the court
had found it appropriate for the federal court to grant habeas relief after
exhaustion, rather than remit the petitioner to his writ of error.
Adverting to the argument that where a defendant has
been regularly indicted, tried, and convicted in a state court, his
only remedy was to carry the judgment to the state court of last
resort, and thence by writ of error to this Court, [Justice
Bradley in Bridges] said: “This might be so if the proceeding in
the state court was merely erroneous; but where it is void for
want of jurisdiction, habeas corpus will lie, and may be issued
by any court or judge invested with supervisory jurisdiction in
such case.”34
Bradley was referring to the distinction, often invoked during this period,
“between an erroneous judgment, and one that is illegal or void.”35 As
the Court put it in Ex parte Siebold, “[t]he only ground on which this court,
or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on
habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another
court, is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the
cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void.”36
The distinction between erroneous and void convictions was
articulated in cases, such as Siebold, involving petitions for habeas corpus
by persons in federal custody, but the Court came to apply the distinction
to habeas petitions by state prisoners.37 In addition to the rendering
court’s lack of jurisdiction over the defendant or the subject matter, the
Court came to recognize as among the flaws that render a conviction void
the unconstitutionality of the statute that the petitioner was convicted of
violating or of the sentence imposed.38 The cases gradually expanding
the types of errors that render a criminal conviction void appear to base
that conclusion on the Court’s evaluation of the importance of the right
that was violated rather than any inherent characteristic of the state
court’s error.39 Be that as it may, the permissible grounds for granting

Eno, 155 U. S. 89 (1894); Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U. S. 100 (1894); Bergemann v. Backer,
157 U. S. 655 (1895).
34

Royall, 117 U.S. at 253.

35

Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879).

36

Id.

37

E.g., Ex parte Frederich, 149 U.S. 70 (1983).

38

See Bator, supra note 3, at 468.

39 This is the position defended by Professor Liebman, who disputes Professor Bator’s
claim that habeas review was available only if the rendering court lacked jurisdiction or if
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habeas relief during this period were narrower than the grounds for
reversing a state court conviction on direct appeal.
Royall’s citation of Bridges suggested that cases in which the state
court judgment was void were among those in which remitting the
prisoner to his writ of error was not appropriate. Later cases, however,
made clear that, except in cases of urgency, a petitioner would be left to
his writ of error even in such cases.40 As Bridges illustrates, the Court did
occasionally uphold a grant of habeas relief to a state prisoner, but, as the
turn of the century approached, the Court’s insistence on the exclusivity
of recourse to the writ of error grew more rigid,41 rendering largely moot
the theoretical availability of habeas to release state prisoners whose
convictions were void.
Importantly, however, the Court’s curtailment of habeas relief for
state prisoners during this period did not mean that federal relief for
erroneously convicted state prisoners was unavailable. Such prisoners
had a right to direct review of their convictions in the U.S. Supreme
Court. The cases limiting the availability of habeas relief when writ of
error review was available were explained in forum-allocation terms. The
Supreme Court was regarded as the more appropriate forum for the
adjudication of such cases because of the sensitivity of the reversal of a
state criminal conviction that had been upheld by the state’s highest
court:
It is an exceedingly delicate jurisdiction given to the
federal courts, by which a person under an indictment in a
state court, and subject to its laws, may, by the decision of a
single judge of the federal court, upon a writ of habeas corpus,
be taken out of the custody of the officers of the state, and
finally discharged therefrom, and thus a trial by the state courts
of an indictment found under the laws of a state be finally
prevented.42
It was considered unseemly for a single lower federal court to set a state
prisoner free and create “unnecessary conflict between courts equally
bound to guard and protect rights secured by the constitution.”43 Only
review in the Supreme Court would be consistent with the dignity of the
the petitioner was convicted under an unconstitutional law or received an unconstitutional
sentence. Liebman, supra note 7, at 2041.
40

E.g., Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898).

41

See Liebman, supra note 7, at 2005.

42

Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898).

43

New York v. Eno, 155 U. S. 89, 94 (1894).
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state courts and respect for their constitutional obligation to enforce
federal rights.44 Confirming the forum-allocation nature of these rules,
the Court did allow the grant of habeas relief in the few cases in which
writ of error review was unavailable.45
II.

THE 1916-1953 PERIOD

Beginning in 1916, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over
state court decisions began to shift from being mandatory to being
discretionary. In 1916, Congress for the first time made Supreme Court
review of some state court decisions denying claims of federal rights
discretionary.46 Writ of error review was retained for state court decisions
upholding “an authority exercised under any State” that had been
challenged on federal grounds, as well as decisions upholding state
statutes challenged on federal grounds or invalidating federal statute33s or
treaties on constitutional grounds.47 In other cases raising federal
questions, review was available only through the discretionary writ of
certiorari. Congress restricted the scope of writ of error review further in
1925, retaining such review only for decisions upholding state statutes
challenged on constitutional grounds or invalidating federal statutes or
treaties on constitutional grounds.48
Although some appeals of state criminal convictions continued to
fall within the categories of cases subject to mandatory Supreme Court
review under the 1916 and 1925 amendments to the Judiciary Act, they
constituted only a small portion of the state criminal convictions that fell
within the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction before 1916. Thus, after 1916,
and especially after 1925, very few persons convicted of crimes in state
court were entitled, as a statutory matter, to federal review of the federal
issues that were decided against them by the state courts.
All agree that de novo review was available to state prisoners via
habeas corpus at least as of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Allen
in 1953. Thus, at least as of that date, federal habeas review filled the gap
that was created by the elimination of mandatory Supreme Court review
44 See Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 195 (1892) (“[C]omity demands that the state courts,
under whose process he is held, and which are, equally with the federal courts, charged
with the duty of protecting the accused in the enjoyment of his constitutional rights,
should be appealed to in the first instance.”). See supra note 33 for additional cases
explaining the preference for review in the Supreme Court.
45

See Liebman, supra note 7, at 2076–81.

46

FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 462–63.

47

Id.

Id. Congress eliminated mandatory Supreme Court review of state courts decisions
entirely in 1988. Id.
48
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via writ of error. The situation during the decades before Brown v. Allen
is a matter of some controversy, however.
The scope of federal habeas review in the decades before Brown
has been the subject of fierce debate among modern scholars. The
controversy is reflected in the highly charged exchange of dicta between
Justice Thomas and Justice O’Connor in Wright v. West.49 One side of this
debate, whose version of the pre-Brown history was endorsed by Justice
Thomas, relies heavily on the analysis of Professor Paul M. Bator in his
influential article, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners.50 This side contends that, before Brown v. Allen, habeas review
was available only for claims that the state court lacked jurisdiction or
denied a full and fair hearing for the constitutional claim. The other side
of the debate, endorsed by Justice O’Connor in Wright v. West, was
developed by Justice Brennan in Fay v. Noia,51 and later defended by
Professor Gary Peller.52 This side contends that de novo review of
constitutional claims was always available on habeas and that only the
substantive protections provided by the Constitution in criminal trials
expanded over the years. More recently, Professor James Liebman has
argued that both Bator and Brennan/Peller got certain aspects of the
history wrong and has defended an intermediate position.53 Liebman
maintains that the availability of habeas review of constitutional questions
was limited when Supreme Court review of state criminal convictions was
mandatory, but became plenary when Supreme Court review became
discretionary.
Justice Frankfurter understated matters when he wrote in 1947
that the availability of habeas relief in the federal courts during this period
was “an untidy area” of the law.54 Nevertheless, the cases do strongly
support two interrelated theses. First, the period between 1916 and 1953
was a transitional period characterized by disagreement among the
Justices about the appropriate scope of habeas review. Second, the
debate among the Justices was not about the need for meaningful federal
review of state criminal convictions, but about whether such review
should take place in the Supreme Court on direct review or in the lower
federal courts via habeas corpus. The need for meaningful review in
some federal court was recognized on all sides; the disagreement was
49

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992).

50

Bator, supra note 3.

51

372 U.S. 391 (1963).

52

See Peller, supra note 6.

53

Liebman, supra note 7.

54

Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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about the appropriate tribunal.
A. The Debate About the Scope of Habeas Review Before Brown
The opening salvo in the current debate about the scope of habeas
review of state criminal convictions during this period came from
Professor Bator. Bator claimed that the basic rule during the Nineteenth
Century was that habeas relief was available only to challenge the
jurisdiction of the committing court, although he acknowledged that the
concept of “jurisdiction” was stretched to include the constitutionality of
the law under which the petitioner was convicted and the constitutionality
of the sentence imposed,55 and he acknowledged that some cases were
difficult to reconcile with his claim.56 According to Bator, the Court
broadened the availability of habeas review in Frank v. Magnum,57 holding
that mob domination of the court and jury would be a cognizable claim
on habeas if the state court system failed to cure the problem by offering
an untainted hearing.58 In his view, the Court in Moore v. Dempsey59
applied this standard and concluded that habeas relief was required
because the state had failed to provide an untainted hearing for the claim
of mob domination.60 According to Professor Bator, the Court in Brown
v. Allen radically expanded the availability of habeas relief by holding for
the first time that habeas was available for the relitigation of
constitutional claims that had been fully and fairly litigated in the state
courts.61
Justice Brennan and Professor Peller, for their part, argued that
federal habeas relief was available for the relitigation of constitutional
claims from the beginning.62 The Nineteenth Century denials of relief
during earlier periods merely reflected the narrow scope then given to
substantive constitutional rights.63 The apparent broadening of habeas
55

See Bator, supra note 3, at 468, 483–84.

56

See id. at 470–71.

57

237 U.S. 309 (1915).

58

Id. at 486–87.

59

Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).

60

See Bator, supra note 3 at 488–91.

61

See id. at 500.

62 Peller, supra note 6, at 663; see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963)
(“Congress
in 1867 sought to provide a federal forum for state prisoners having constitutional
defenses by extending the habeas corpus powers of the federal courts to their
constitutional maximum. Obedient to this purpose, we have consistently held that federal
court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not
defeated by anything that may occur in the state court proceedings.”).
63

Peller, supra note 6, at 621–22.
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relief reflected in Moore and then in Brown actually resulted from the
progressive broadening of constitutional protections in the criminal
sphere.64
Professor Liebman argues that both Bator and Peller get the history
wrong in certain respects.65 Liebman argues that the 1867 statute always
authorized review of constitutional issues decided by the state courts, but
only “where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his
rights.”66 During the Nineteenth Century, habeas was almost never
necessary for this purpose, as any person convicted in the state courts had
a right to Supreme Court review of any federal questions decided against
him by the state court. Thus the Court during this period established that
federal habeas corpus was not available as a substitute for writ of error
review, holding that the writ of error was the exclusive remedy.67 But,
according to Liebman, the Court abandoned its rule treating writ of error
review as exclusive in the early Twentieth Century when its mandatory
writ of error jurisdiction came to be replaced by discretionary certiorari
jurisdiction.68
The replacement of mandatory review with discretionary review
happened officially with the enactment of legislation amending the
statutes governing the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 1916 and
1925, but Professor Liebman claims that the change began to occur
“unofficially” shortly before that.69 Thus, he explains Frank v. Magnum’s
failure to rely on the exclusivity of writ of error review in 1915 as
resulting from the unofficial “certiorarification” of the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction,70 and he argues that the Moore v. Dempsey decision in 1923 was
based on the statutory shift to certiorari review.71
The different
outcomes in Frank and Moore, according to Liebman, are attributable to
their differing conceptions of the mob domination question. In Frank,
the question was treated as one of fact, as to which de novo habeas
review does not extend; in Moore, the issue was treated as a mixed

64

See id. at 643–44, 647–49.

65

Liebman, supra note 7, at 2054.

66

Id. at 2055 (quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942)).

67

See Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101 (1898). See supra Part I.

68

See Liebman, supra note 7, at 2075.

69

See id. at 2077–78.

See id. Professor Liebman was referring to the Court’s practice of dismissing writs of
error summarily if they did not present a substantial federal question.
70

71

See id.
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question subject to de novo review.72 In Liebman’s view, de novo
relitigation of legal and mixed questions on habeas has clearly been
available since writ of error review was replaced by certiorari review.73
The only significant change between Moore and Brown, in his view, was the
increase in the number of federal constitutional rights applicable in state
criminal proceedings. 74
Professors Bator and Peller both acknowledge that some of the
Court’s cases are in tension with their theories, as did Justice Brennan.75
Their disagreement was thus about the overall thrust of the law during
this period. Professor Liebman too recognizes that some of the cases
were difficult to reconcile with his theory.76 In particular, he recognizes
that “the Court took time to come to grips with the fact that the
certioratification of its direct appeal docket made the Royall compromise
untenable,” and that, “[a]lthough Frank and especially Moore adumbrated
the Court’s eventual resolution, only Brown forthrightly adopted it.” 77 As
the cases discussed below show, however, Brown was not a belated
recognition of a change in the Court’s direct review that had occurred
many years earlier. Rather, the pre-Brown cases reflected the continued
belief by the Court (or some Justices), long after the Court had adopted a
highly discretionary approach reviewing state court decisions on other
matters, that the Supreme Court had a duty to review the constitutional
claims of persons convicted of crimes in state court.

72

See id. at 2078–80.

73

See id. at 2080–81.

74

See id. at 2081–83.

Professor Bator admitted that the Court gave no consideration to the “reaches and
purposes of the habeas jurisdiction” between Frank and Brown and that “some opinions []
could be taken to intimate that the writ automatically reaches the merits of all federal
constitutional questions.” Bator, supra note 3, at 496–98. Justice Brennan conceded that
the Court did not hold to an “unwavering line in its conclusions as to the availability of
the Great Writ,” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 411–412 (1963), and that the availability of writ
of error review prior to 1916 was “a powerful influence against the allowance of [habeas
review for] state prisoners.” Id. at 413. Finally, in examining how denials of certiorari
foreclosed habeas review of state-prisoner claims between Frank and Brown, Professor
Peller explains that “Hawk and its progeny invited the federal habeas courts to give
substantive weight to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari,” but that these lower courts
at the time either gave no weight to the Court’s denials or were in fact “deferring to the
Supreme Court,” rather than the state courts. Peller, supra note 6, at 660–61.
75

76 See Liebman, supra note 7, at 2083 (noting that, although “some pre-Brown cases
assumed or concluded that the Court’s denial of certiorari did not supply the statutorily
mandated review as of right,” “[o]ther decisions did give the denial of certiorari effect.”).
77

Id.
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Professor Liebman is correct in arguing that the federal courts’
habeas jurisdiction expanded to fill the gap in federal review left by the
certiorarification of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. But the
cases show that this certiorarification took considerably longer to take
hold with respect to state court decisions resulting in criminal convictions
than in other cases. Well after 1916, a majority of Justices continued to
adhere to the Court’s pre-1916 view that the sensitive task of reviewing
state court convictions and possibly releasing a state prisoner whose
conviction had been affirmed by the highest state courts was a task solely
for the Supreme Court itself to perform. Only when the Court came to
realize that it could no longer hope to fulfill this error-correction role did
the Court definitively abandon the pre-1916 preference for direct review
as the exclusive mechanism for reviewing state court convictions. The
Court wavered on this point in the years immediately preceding Brown.
The Court’s definitive abandonment of its insistence on direct review as
the preferred mechanism for reviewing state court convictions is reflected
in its holding in Brown that denials of certiorari do not reflect the Justices’
views on the merits of the petitioners’ federal claims. The Court’s
holding in Brown that habeas courts should apply a de novo standard in
deciding questions of law and missed questions of law and fact was
directly related to its holding that the Court’s denial of certiorari should
be given no weight by federal courts adjudicating habeas petitions.
B. The Court’s Gradual Expansion of Habeas Review Between
1916 and 1953
Professor Liebman is clearly right to note that habeas relief was
generally unavailable when a state prisoner had a right to direct review in
the Supreme Court via writ of error. He also convincingly shows that,
after the shift from mandatory to discretionary direct review, the Court
abandoned pre-1916 limits on the availability of habeas relief in direct
response to the more limited availability of direct review of state criminal
convictions in the Supreme Court. But this shift did not occur on or
around 1916. The shift was more gradual and only completed with the
Brown decision in 1953.
a. The Court’s Continued Application of Pre-1916 Limits
In the early post-1916 cases, the Court continued to invoke and
apply the proposition that habeas relief is available only if the state court
lacked jurisdiction or if for other reasons its judgment was void. In
Knewal v. Egan, for example, the Court wrote that “[i]t is the settled rule of
this court that habeas corpus calls in question only the jurisdiction of the
court whose judgment is challenged.”78 As late as 1938, the Court was
78

268 U.S. 442, 445 (1925) (citing, inter alia, Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (1915)).
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continuing to recite this limit on habeas relief. Thus, in Johnson v. Zerbst,
the Court wrote that “habeas corpus cannot be used as a means of
reviewing errors of law and irregularities – not involving the question of
jurisdiction – occurring during the course of trial,” and that the "writ of
habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error."79
At the same time, the Court expanded the concept of jurisdictional
errors to include errors that are not jurisdictional in any straightforward
sense. Thus, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court concluded that a violation of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the course of a trial “stands
as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of
his life or his liberty.”80 The Court’s characterization of this defect as a
jurisdictional one appears to have followed, in the Court’s analysis, from
its view that denial of habeas relief for this type of error would have left
the victim of a constitutional error remediless: “To deprive a citizen of
his only effective remedy would not only be contrary to the ‘rudimentary
demands of justice’ but destructive of a constitutional guaranty
specifically designed to prevent injustice.”81 The Court appears to have
concluded that any violation of constitutional rights was a “jurisdictional”
defect warranting habeas relief, reasoning that, “[s]ince the Sixth
Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the
assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an
essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive
an accused of his life or liberty.”82 That the Court had reached this
understanding of a “jurisdictional” defect, and thus of the available scope
of habeas relief, is confirmed by its decision the following Term in Bowen
v. Johnston. After again reciting that “[t]he scope of review on habeas
corpus is limited to the examination of the jurisdiction of the court whose
judgment of conviction is challenged,”83 the Court went on to state: “But
if it be found that the court had no jurisdiction to try the petitioner, or that
in its proceedings his constitutional rights have been denied, the remedy of habeas
corpus is available.”84
The Court abandoned the “jurisdictional” limitation with respect to
claims of constitutional error a few years later in Waley v. Johnston. The
Court stated:
79

304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (citing, inter alia, Knewal, 268 U.S. 442).

80

Id. at 468.

81

Id. at 467.

82

Id.

83

306 U.S. 19, 23 (1939) (citing, inter alia, Knewal, 268 U.S. 442).

Id. at 24 (citing, inter alia, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923), and Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938)).
84
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[T]he use of the writ in the federal courts to test the
constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is not restricted
to those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for
want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It extends
also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in
disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where
the writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights.85
Professor Liebman argues that this had been the rule all along. State
court convictions infected with constitutional error had always been
understood to render the conviction “void,” but, when the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions was mandatory,
habeas review was not “the only effective means if preserving [the
prisoner’s] rights.” When the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction became
discretionary, he argues, this rationale for denying habeas relief
evaporated and habeas relief became widely available.86
The cases discussed above, however, indicate that the
“jurisdictional” category came to encompass constitutional errors only
gradually.
The demise of the preference for direct review of state
criminal convictions also occurred more gradually. Indeed, the Court in
Waley itself hinted at this latter limitation when it noted that habeas relief
was appropriate in the case because “[t]he facts relied on are dehors the
record and their effect on the judgment was not open to consideration
and review on appeal.”87 This qualification suggests the Court’s continued
adherence to the belief that habeas should not be used as a substitute for
direct review in the Supreme Court.
Earlier post-1916 are more explicit in asserting the exclusivity of
direct review, even in cases that did not appear to fall within the scope of
the Court’s narrowed mandatory jurisdiction. Thus, in Craig v. Hecht,
decided in 1923, the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief on the
ground that “[t]he circuit court of appeals correctly applied the well
established general rule that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be utilized for
the purpose of proceedings in error.”88 And in Goto v. Lane, decided the
following year, the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief on the
ground that, “[i]f [the court in which the petitioner was convicted] erred
in determining [federal law], its judgment was not for that reason void,
but subject to correction in regular course on writ of error. If the
85 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1943). These propositions applied at least to the
case before the Court because
86

Liebman, supra note 7, at 2083.
87

88

Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. at 104.

263 U.S. at 277 (1923).
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questions presented involved the application of constitutional principles,
that alone did not alter the rule. And, if the petitioners permitted the time
within which a review on writ of error might be obtained to elapse and
thereby lost the opportunity for such a review, that gave no right to resort
to habeas corpus as a substitute.”89 And in United States ex rel. Kennedy
v. Tyler, decided in 1925, the Court wrote:
In so far as [the petitioner’s claims] involve treaty or
constitutional rights, [the state] courts are as competent
as the federal courts to decide them. In the regular and
ordinary course of procedure, the power of the highest
state court in respect of such questions should first be
exhausted. When that has been done, the authority of
this court may be invoked to protect a party against any
adverse decision involving a denial of a federal right
properly asserted by him.90
As late as the early 1940’s, the lower federal courts understood the
Supreme Court’s doctrine on this question to be that “[w]hen [a state
prisoner] has exhausted the judicial remedies afforded by the State and
has secured a decision from its highest court, his sole recourse will be to
invoke the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States ‘to
protect . . . against any adverse decision involving a denial of a federal
right properly asserted . . . .”91 “In view of the delicate question of
interference by inferior Federal courts with the judgments of the courts
of a sovereign state of the Union which is presented by an application
[for habeas corpus], it appears to be the approved practice that if such an
application is to be presented after exhaustion of State judicial remedies,
it should be made directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.”92
The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Ex parte Hawk, in 1944,
citing the foregoing lower court cases and others to the same effect,
apparently with approval.93 The Court stated that, “[w]here the state
courts have considered and adjudicated the merits of his contentions, and
this Court has either reviewed or declined to review the state court's
decision, a federal court will not ordinarily reexamine upon writ of habeas
corpus the questions thus adjudicated.”94 The Court did qualify this rule:
89

265 U.S. 393, 402 (1924).

90

269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925).

Hawk v. Olson, 130 F.2d 910, 912 (8th Cir. 1942) (quoting United States ex rel.
Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925)).
91

92

Kramer v. State of Nevada, 122 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1941).

93

Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944).

94

Id. at 118.
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“[W]here resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a full and fair
adjudication of the federal contentions raised, either because the state
affords no remedy, or because in the particular case the remedy afforded
by state law proves in practice unavailable or seriously inadequate, a
federal court should entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he
would be remediless.”95 These exceptions appear to align with Professor
Bator’s view of the limited nature of federal habeas relief before Brown.
These cases are thus in tension with Professor Liebman’s claim that
habeas review of constitutional issues became generally available at the
time of, and as a result of, the certiorarification of the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction just before 1916. Even well after the Court’s
mandatory review by writ of error was replaced by discretionary certiorari
review, the Court continued to express the view that review of state
criminal convictions should ordinarily occur in the Supreme Court on
direct review rather than on collateral review through habeas corpus.
Nevertheless, the cases support a forum-allocation understanding
of habeas jurisdiction. As shown below, the Court determined the
availability of habeas based on its views regarding the proper federal
forum for reviewing state criminal convictions. The limitations on the
availability of habeas relief during this period did not reflect the view that
state prisoners convicted as a result of constitutional error should
nevertheless remain in prison. The Court’s continuing insistence that
review of state criminal convictions take place in the Supreme Court
reflected its view that the Supreme Court itself was the appropriate forum
for monitoring state court decisions resulting in custody, and that the
Court remained capable of doing so. Gradually, as the constitutional
rights of prisoners expanded and the number of cases increased, the
Court reached the conclusion that it could no longer fulfill that role. It is
no coincidence that Brown v. Allen, the case that all agree affirmed the
right to relitigate constitutional issues through habeas, was also the case in
which the Court for the first time definitely held that a federal habeas
petitioner need not have sought direct review in the Supreme Court on
certiorari.96
Today, the Supreme Court grants a minuscule proportion of the
petitions for certiorari presented to it.97 It selects cases presenting
important, broadly applicable issues in which the lower courts or the state

95

Id.

96 See Edward Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the
Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1713 (2000).
97 The Supreme Court – The Statistics, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 389 (2015) (noting that in
2014 the Court only granted review for one percent of the petitions before it).
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courts have reached conflicting decisions.98 A petition arguing that the
court below has made a case-specific constitutional error will rarely, if
ever, be granted.99 If the Court had applied that standard during the years
immediately following 1916, then many convictions vitiated by
constitutional error would have remained unremedied as a result of the
Court’s insistence that such convictions should ordinarily be reviewed by
the Court itself or not at all. But the Court did not apply today’s
certiorari standard to certiorari petitions by state prisoners until well after
1916.
b. The Court’s Early Approach to Certiorari
The main advocate of limiting writ of error review and expanding
certiorari review was the Supreme Court itself, principally Chief Justice
Taft. In advocating this change, the Justices assured Congress that it
would exercise its discretion with particular attention to its responsibility
to protect constitutional rights. As far as the Justices’ statements to
Congress revealed, writes Professor Hartnett,
the only use envisioned in constitutional cases was as a way
of quickly dealing with claims that were either frivolous or
plainly governed by precedent – that is, in cases where the
lower court was obviously correct and summary affirmance
would be appropriate. Taft expressed confidence that in no
case “would a constitutional question of any real merit or
doubt escape our review by the method of certiorari,”
explaining that the restrictions were merely “to keep out
constitutional questions that have really no weight or have
been fully decided in previous cases and that have only been
projected into the case for the purpose of securing delay or
a reconsideration of questions the decision of which has
already become settled law.”100
Consistent with this legislative history, the rule the Court adopted
at the time to guide the exercise of its discretion with respect to certiorari
differed substantially from the present rule. Today’s rule reflects the
Court’s focus on ensuring uniformity in the interpretation of federal law.
The factors it takes into account in granting certiorari include only the
existence of a conflict in the interpretation of federal law among the
courts of appeals or the state courts and the “importan[ce]” of the legal
98

EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 239 (10th ed. 2013).

99 Id. (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of
law.”).
100

Id. at 1715.
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question.101 The current rule also makes clear that “[a] petition for a writ
of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of . . . the
misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”102
The 1925 version of the rule differed in important respects.
According to the earlier rule, the “reasons which will be considered” in
determining whether to grant certiorari included that “a state court has
decided a federal question of substance . . . in a way probably not in
accord with applicable decisions of this court.”103 As written, the rule
suggests that the Court at that time understood its role, with respect to
cases coming from the state courts, to include an error correction
function. This would be consistent with the assurances the Chief Justice
provided to Congress in advocating the shift to certiorari review. Under
this standard, a denial of certiorari in a case coming from the state courts
might be understood to reflect a determination by at least six Justices that
the underlying constitutional question had (in the Chief Justice’s words)
“no weight” or had been “projected into the case for the purpose of
securing delay or a reconsideration of questions the decision of which has
already become settled law.”104
Whether the Court in fact exercised its discretion in this way with
respect to requests for review from persons convicted of crimes in state
court is difficult to demonstrate directly. Since the Court does not
explain its reasons for denying certiorari, it is difficult to establish
definitively that such denials were tantamount to a determination on the
101

SUP. CT. R. 10. Rule 10 lists the following three factors:

•

•
•

102

(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the
same important matter; has decided an important federal question in a
way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has
so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call
for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court
of last resort or of a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be,
settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a
way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.

Id.

See SUP. CT. R. 35.5(a), 266 U.S. 681 (1924); see William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court Under the Act of February 13, 1925, 35 YALE L. J. 1, 3 (1925).
103

104

Harnett, supra note 96, at 1731 n. 488.
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merits that the underlying claim lacked merit. Nevertheless, there is
indirect support for the proposition that, at least in the early years, the
Justices so understood the denial of certiorari to petitions filed by state
prisoners.
Preliminarily, the data concerning the number of such filings are
consistent with this thesis. The table in the Appendix indicates the
number of requests for review filed in the Supreme Court between 1916
and 1953 by persons convicted of crimes in state court. Column A lists
the number of requests for review filed by writ of error each year.
Column B lists the number of requests for review by writ of certiorari
filed each year. Column C indicates the number of petitions for certiorari
denied in each year. The table shows that, until 1933, the number of
certiorari petitions filed was in the single digits except for one year (1928)
in which eleven certiorari petitions were filed. With such a low number
of petitions to consider, it is plausible that the Court’s decisions on
petitions for certiorari brought by state prisoners reflected the Justices’
views on the merits of the claims presented. Between 1934 and 1939, the
number of petitions each year was in the teens (or lower). The annual
number was in the twenties from 1940 to 1945, and thereafter was in the
30s and 40s. With this larger number of petitions, it is plausible that the
Justices came to conclude that it was no longer feasible for it to continue
to base its decisions regarding certiorari on its views of the underlying
merits of the claims raised.
Affirmative support for the claim that denials of certiorari during
this period to persons convicted of crimes in state courts reflected the
Justices’ views on the merits of the petitions can be found in the Justices’
opinions. As noted above, the early cases, up to and including Ex parte
Hawk, reveal that, in the absence of exceptional urgency warranting a
departure from the usual exhaustion rules, the Court insisted that state
prisoners seek direct review in the Supreme Court and that, if the Court
denied review, a lower federal court should ordinarily deny a subsequent
habeas petition. In support of this procedure, the Court cited pre-1916
cases that, in turn, made clear that the exclusivity of writ of error review
was not just a matter of judicial efficiency. The rule was also based on the
notion that reversing a state criminal conviction that had been upheld by
the states’ highest courts was a delicate matter. It was unseemly for a
single federal judge to set at liberty a duly convicted prisoner who had
received several layers of review in the state courts.105 The Court’s forumallocation rule was thus based on the conviction that, of the two available
avenues for reviewing state criminal convictions, direct review in the
Supreme Court was superior from the standpoint of federal-state relations
105
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and respect for the dignity of state courts, and that the lower federal
courts should accordingly grant habeas relief only in cases of peculiar
urgency.
The Court’s continuing invocation of this preference after 1916
means that the Court believed that this rationale retained force despite the
shift to discretionary review. This choice between two remedies available
in federal court makes sense only if direct review offered a realistic
avenue for correcting the errors that would otherwise be corrected in the
lower federal courts on habeas. (As we have seen, this category was
understood to encompass in principle all constitutional errors at least as
of 1942.) The idea was that it was the Supreme Court’s obligation to
monitor state court compliance with federal law in criminal cases. And
since “ought” presupposes “can,” the Court’s adherence to this forum
allocation reflects the Justices’ views that fulfilling this role was possible
for the Court.
c. Post-Hawk Erosion of Preference for Direct Review
The Court’s decisions after Ex parte Hawk show the gradual erosion
of the pre-1916 limits on habeas review. At the same time, these cases
provide additional support for the claim that these limits continued to be
applied well into the 1916-1953 period.
The post-Hawk decisions wavered on whether a request for direct
review in the Supreme Court should be a pre-requisite for seeking habeas
corpus in the lower federal courts. The opinions in these cases show that
the Justices who insisted on that requirement did so out of a belief, based
on the dignitary concerns mentioned earlier, that reviewing a state
conviction and possibly releasing a state prisoner was a role for the
Supreme Court and not the lower federal courts. The cases show that the
Justices believed until at least the mid-1940’s that the Supreme Court had
a “duty of passing upon charges of state violations of federal
constitutional rights” in such cases.106
Gradually, the contrary view came to prevail. The debate between
the Justices in these later cases sheds useful light on the rationale
supporting the narrower availability of habeas review in the earlier period
as well as the rationale for dropping those limits. The limits were dropped
because the Justices came to recognize that, in light of the Supreme
Court’s increasing caseload, the Court could no longer hope to fulfill an
error correction function, even in the subcategory of cases consisting of
requests for direct review by state prisoners.
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Four years after Ex parte Hawk, the Court in Wade v. Mayo relaxed
the requirement that a habeas petitioner have sought direct review of his
claims in the Supreme Court. The majority quoted the relevant passage
from Ex parte Hawk and agreed that:
Considerations of prompt and orderly procedure in the
federal courts will often dictate that direct review be
sought first in this Court. And where a prisoner has
neglected to seek that review, such failure may be a
relevant consideration for a district court in determining
whether to entertain a subsequent habeas corpus
petition.107
Nevertheless, the Court declined to adopt a “hard and fast rule” requiring
a prior request for direct review in the Supreme Court. The majority
cited “the volume of this Court’s business,”108 and said that “[m]atters
relevant to the exercise of our certiorari discretion frequently result in
denials of the writ without any consideration of the merits.”109 “Where it
is apparent or even possible” that the Court’s views regarding the
substance of the claim “ha[d] no bearing” on the denial of the writ,
“failure to file a petition should not prejudice the right to file a habeas
corpus application in a district court.”110 In the case before it, the Court
concluded that it was “reasonably certain” that the writ had been denied
because of doubts about whether the state court judgment rested on an
adequate state ground.111
The majority’s analysis shows that even the Justices in favor of
relaxing the requirement understood that a denial of certiorari in cases
seeking review of state court convictions sometimes reflected the Justices’
views of the merits, and they required a showing of at least a possibility
that such was the case. But these Justices were willing to relax the
requirement because, by this time, in their view, denials of certiorari
“frequently” did not reflect the Justices’ views of the merits and, in light
of the volume of the Court’s business, “[g]ood judicial administration is
not furthered by insistence on futile procedure.”112
Writing for four Justices, Justice Reed strenuously dissented.
According to the dissenting Justices, “wise administration commands that
107
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this Court be asked, by appeal or certiorari, to pass upon the federal
constitutional questions presented. It is only by such a procedure that the
validity of state criminal conviction can be expeditiously and finally
adjudicated.”113 Justice Reed elaborated:
[W]henever a prisoner brings a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the federal courts challenging collaterally a
conviction in the state courts and asking release from state
custody, serious questions of the relation between the federal
and state judicial structures are raised. “It is an exceedingly
delicate jurisdiction given to the federal courts, by which a
person under indictment in a state court, and subject to its
laws, may, by a decision of a single judge of a federal court,
upon a writ of habeas corpus, be taken out of the custody of
the officers of the state and finally discharged therefrom . . . .”
Respect for the theory and practice of our dual system
government requires that federal courts intervene by habeas
corpus in state criminal prosecutions only in exceptional
circumstances.114
Justice Reed referred to appeal and certiorari as “the normal paths of
review” which, when they are “open to correct federal constitutional
errors in state criminal proceedings,” bears upon the desirability of
limiting the habeas corpus power of federal courts in respect of state
criminal prosecutions.115 “It is not seemly that years after a conviction,
when time has dulled memories, when death has stilled tongues, when
records are unavailable, convicted felons, unburdened by any handicap to
a normal presentation of any claim of unfairness in their trial, should be
permitted to attack their sentences collaterally by habeas corpus because
of errors, known to them at the time of trial.”116
Justice Reed did not state directly that a denial of certiorari
ordinarily reflects the Justices’ view that the petitioner’s claims are
unmeritorious, but this would appear to be the implication of his
insistence that the availability of certiorari review – the “normal”
“remedy” for constitutional errors in the state courts – should ordinarily
preclude habeas relief, despite his agreement that the writ of habeas
corpus is “a proper procedure ‘to safeguard the liberty of all persons . . .
113
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against infringement through any violation of the Constitution.’”117 That
this was his view is confirmed by his opinion for the majority in Darr v.
Burford, discussed below.
Between the decisions in Wade v. Mayo and Darr v. Burford, Congress
amended the habeas statute.118 The amendment codified the exhaustion
rule of Ex parte Hawk in the following terms:
Sec. 2254. State custody; remedies in State courts. An
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is
either an absence of available State corrective process or the
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner.
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning
of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to
raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.119
Although the amendment did not refer to direct review in the
Supreme Court, the chairman of the committee appointed by the Judicial
Conference of the United States to propose the amendment that was
ultimately adopted, Judge John Parker of the Fourth Circuit, explained
that its primary purpose was to ensure that, except in exceptional
circumstances, review of state criminal convictions should take place
solely in the Supreme Court:
The thing in mind in the drafting of this section was to provide
that review of state court action be had so far as possible only
by the Supreme Court of the United States, whose review of
such action has historical basis, and that review not be had by
the lower federal courts, whose exercise of such power is
unseemly and likely to breed dangerous conflicts of
jurisdiction.120

117 Id. at 690 (Reed, J., dissenting) (quoting Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 331
(1915)).
118 Congress enacted the amendment just two days after the decision in Wade v. Mayo
came down, so Congress did not take the decision into account in its deliberations.
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The amendment accomplished this goal through its final clause:
The effect of this last provision is to eliminate, for all practical
purposes, the right to apply to the lower federal courts for
habeas corpus in all states in which successive applications may
be made for habeas corpus to the state courts; for, in all such
states, the applicant has the right, notwithstanding the denial of
prior applications, to apply again to the state courts for habeas
corpus and to have action upon such later application reviewed
by the Supreme Court of the United States on application for
certiorari.121
According to Judge Parker, the holding of Wade v. Mayo would now
“be in the teeth of” the habeas statute.122 As Parker described the effect
of the amendment, “[t]here is preserved in full the right of persons
imprisoned under judgments of state and federal courts to ask release on
the ground that they have been denied the sort of trial guaranteed by the
Constitution; but effective provision is made against the unseemly
incidents which have arisen in the assertion of the right. . . . [T]here
should be no more cases where proceedings of state courts, affirmed by
the highest courts of the state, with denial of certiorari by the Supreme
Court of the United States, will be reviewed by federal circuit or district
judges.”123
Parker did not state expressly that the amendment
presupposed that Supreme Court denials of certiorari reflected the
Justices’ view that the underlying claims were unmeritorious, but that is a
fair inference from his statement that the amendment would avoid the
“unseemly conflicts of jurisdiction which have arisen under recent habeas
corpus decisions, without in anywise impairing the rights which it was the purpose
of those decisions to protect.”124
The Court relied in part on this amendment, and quoted Judge
Parker’s article at length, when it reversed Wade v. Mayo in Darr v. Burford
and reimposed a rigid requirement of prior request for Supreme Court
review via certiorari (in the absence of exceptional circumstances
warranting a departure from the exhaustion requirement).125 Justice
Reed’s opinion for the Court in Darr also explained in greater depth the
theory underlying the rule. Justice Reed quoted Brice v. Grice regarding the
“exceedingly delicate jurisdiction” by which a single federal judge is
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empowered to release a state prisoner,126 adding that:
“The jurisdiction is more delicate, the reason against its exercise
stronger, when a single judge is invoked to reverse the decision
of the highest court of a State in which the constitutional rights
of a prisoner could have been claimed.”127
For this reason,
It is this Court's conviction that orderly federal procedure under
our dual system of government demands that the state's highest
courts should ordinarily be subject to reversal only by this Court
and that a state's system for the administration of justice should
be condemned as constitutionally inadequate only by this
Court.128
The Court further referred to “[t]he responsibility to intervene in state
criminal matters,” which “rests primarily upon this Court.”129 State
prisoners should be required to seek direct review because “[t]he
opportunity to meet that constitutional responsibility should be
afforded.”130 Justice Reed also referred to the Supreme Court’s “duty of
passing upon charges of state violations of federal constitutional
rights.”131 If the Justices have a “responsibility” and a “duty” to pass
upon constitutional questions that arise in state criminal cases, and if that
is the basis for limiting the discretion of the lower federal courts from
doing so, then the Court’s disposition of petitions for certiorari by state
prisoners must reflect the Justices’ views on the underlying merits of their
claims.
By the time of Darr v. Burford, it is likely that these views were those
of a minority of the Court. Justice Reed purported to be leaving open the
question of “what effect the lower federal courts should accord a denial
of certiorari by this Court when the state prisoner later applies for federal
habeas corpus.”132 Justice Frankfurter’s dissent understood Reed to be
taking the position that the lower courts should treat a denial of certiorari
as a decision on the merits. His reading of Reed’s opinion was well
126
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grounded, based on the excerpts from Reed’s opinion quoted above.
Justice Reed’s denial of Frankfurter’s characterization of his views was
only partial: He conceded that a denial of certiorari might reflect doubts
about whether the underlying decision rested on adequate state grounds,
and he suggested that the lower courts should be free to reach the merits
of the habeas petition when the Court includes “an express direction that
the petitioner may proceed in the federal district court without prejudice
from the denial of his petition for certiorari.”133 In the end, Reed
purported to leave that question open.134
But, more importantly, two members of the majority filed a
concurring opinion indicating that they joined Justice Reed’s opinion
“except for any indication it may contain that, although the reasons for a
denial of certiorari are not stated, they nevertheless may be inferred from
the record.”135 In the view of Justices Burton and Clark, “when the
reasons for a denial of certiorari are not stated, the denial should be
disregarded in passing upon a subsequent application for relief.”136 It
thus appears that a majority of the Court (the four dissenters and the two
concurring Justices) had by this time concluded that a denial of certiorari
did not ordinarily reflect the view that the underlying claims were
unmeritorious. The views expressed by Justice Reed are nevertheless
important – not because they reflect the views of a majority of the Court
in 1950, but because they explain the rationale for the rule the Court
adhered to until at least 1944.
In view of the concurring opinion of Burton and Clark, it is fair to
infer that the views of a majority of the Court in 1950 regarding the
meaning of a denial of certiorari filed by a state prisoner is reflected in
Justice Frankfurter’s lengthy dissenting opinion in Darr. Frankfurter
explained that the majority’s principal error was to treat the writ of
certiorari as if it served the same function as the writ of error, when in
fact the two are very different:
A writ of error was a writ of right. It makes all the difference in
the world whether a prisoner knocks at the door of this Court
to invoke its grace or has unquestioned access for the final
determination of the federal question as to which the highest
court of the State was merely an intermediate tribunal. . . . . In
the writ of error cases this Court held habeas corpus in the
lower federal courts ought not to take the place of a mandatory
133
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appeal. But this jurisdictional situation was drastically changed
by the Act of September 6, 1916, 39 Stat. 726, and the Act of
February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936. . . . After this shift from
review as of right to review by grace, it could no longer be said
that a litigant forwent his right to have this Court review, and
reverse a State court. The right was gone. Only an opportunity
– and a slim one – remained. It completely misconceives the
doctrine which required a case to be brought to this Court by
writ of error, because it was the duty of this Court to
adjudicate the claim on the merits, to apply it to the totally
different factors involved in certiorari.137
In arguing that state prisoners should not be required to seek certiorari
before petitioning for habeas corpus, Frankfurter noted the variety
reasons for denying certiorari, “which precludes the implication that were
the case here the merits would go against the petitioner.”138 In Justice
Frankfurter’s words:
Petitions may have been denied because, even though serious
constitutional questions were raised, it seemed to at least six
members of the Court that the issue was either not ripe
enough or too moribund for adjudication; that the question
had better await the perspective of time or that time would
soon bury the question or, for one reason or another, it was
desirable to wait and see; or that the constitutional issue was
entangled with nonconstitutional issues that raised
doubt whether the constitutional issue could be effectively
isolated; or for various other reasons not relating to
the merits.139
This approach to certiorari, Frankfurter explained, was a necessary one.
“It must be so unless the whole conception of certiorari in relation to the
business of this Court is to be radically transformed.” “The most weighty
considerations of practical administration counsel against” requiring state
prisoners to seek relief in the Supreme Court.140 Given the Court’s
“increasing subjection of State convictions to federal judicial review
through the expanded concept of due process” during the previous
twenty years,141 and the resulting “flood of habeas corpus cases,”142 a
137
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requirement that state prisoners seek relief in the Supreme Court would
mean that “[t]he burden of the court’s volume of business will be greatly
increased.”143
Additionally, for a variety of reasons, the district courts are better
placed to address these claims than is the Supreme Court. First, “cases
involving federal claims by State prisoners . . . frequently involve
questions of State law which must be answered before the federal issue
can be reached,”144 and the district courts are better situated to address
such issues. Additionally, the Supreme Court “can dispose of [these
cases] only as a matter of abstract pleading,” whereas “[t]he District
Courts . . . can hold hearings when deemed appropriate, consider
allegations on their merits if they are at all substantial and dispose of what
often turn, out to be unmeritorious claims.”145 For all of these reasons,
“[i]n the present context of the Court's business in relation to these cases
– their volume and the required knowledge of local law with which the
local federal judges are much more familiar than we can possibly be – all
considerations of policy” support the conclusion that these cases belong
in the district courts rather than the Supreme Court.146
In sum, Frankfurter’s dissent in Darr rests squarely on the
recognition that the Supreme Court could no longer effectively monitor
state court compliance with federal constitutional law in the “flood” of
criminal appeals resulting from the expansion of the constitutional limits
on state criminal proceedings, as well as on “policy” considerations
making the lower federal courts the better forum for deciding these cases.
Frankfurter’s arguments regarding the meaning of a denial of certiorari
seem obvious to any observer of Supreme Court practice in 2016. What
is noteworthy, however, is that these views are being articulated in a
dissenting opinion in 1950, thirty-four years after the shift from writ of
error to certiorari review. Although it is possible that these views
commanded the support of a majority of the Court by this time, the
Court appears to have arrived at the conclusions reached by Justice
Frankfurter only gradually.
The question of the weight to be given by habeas courts to the
Supreme Court’s prior denial of certiorari was finally settled three years
later in Brown v. Allen.147 In holding that such denials should be given no
143
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weight, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for a majority repeated some of the
same arguments found in his Darr dissent, and he elaborated on the
reasons making the district courts more appropriate fora than the
Supreme Court for deciding these cases:
These petitions for certiorari are rarely drawn by lawyers; some
are almost unintelligible and certainly do not present a clear
statement of issues necessary for our understanding, in view of
the pressure of the Court's work. The certified records we have
in the run of certiorari cases to assist understanding are almost
unknown in this field. Indeed, the number of cases in which
most of the papers necessary to prove what happened in the
State proceedings are not filed is striking. Whether there has been
an adjudication or simply a perfunctory denial of a claim below is
rarely ascertainable. Seldom do we have enough on which to base
a solid conclusion as to the adequacy of the State adjudication.
Even if we are told something about a trial of the claims the
applicant asserts, we almost never have a transcript of these
proceedings to assist us in determining whether the trial was
adequate. Equally unsatisfactory as a means for evaluating the
State proceedings is the filing of opinions; in less than one-fourth
of the cases is more than a perfunctory order of the State courts
filed.148
Thus, Brown reflects the Court’s preference for district courts over the
Supreme Court on direct review as the forum for resolving these cases, a
preference based on the Court’s view that the Court should be focusing
on “questions of sufficient gravity,”149 as well as the burden that the
“flood” of criminal cases would impose on the Court, and the fact that
district courts are better situated to handle these cases for a number of
reasons. The Court’s well-known holding in Brown affirming the
availability of de novo review of legal and mixed questions was directly
tied to its largely forgotten holding that Supreme Court denials of
certiorari were to be given no weight by the lower courts entertaining
habeas corpus petitions.
In sum, even during the period between 1916 and 1953, the
doctrine regarding the scope of habeas review in the lower federal courts
served a forum-allocation function. Limitations on the availability of
habeas review in the lower federal courts were justified on the ground
in the Supreme Court through certiorari was not reversed until 1963 in Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963).
148
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that it was the responsibility of the Supreme Court to exercise this
“delicate jurisdiction.” Recognition of the need for review of state
convictions in some federal court was a constant; the debate was about
which federal court should undertake such review. The view that state
prisoners should remain in custody without federal review of claimed
constitutional errors in their convictions was not reflected in majority
opinions during this era.
III. THE 1953-1996 PERIOD
Between its decision in Brown v. Allen and the enactment of AEDPA
in 1996, the Supreme Court adhered to the view that de novo review was
available on habeas for cognizable constitutional claims. The Burger and
Rehnquist Courts tightened the procedural requirements for obtaining
habeas relief and placed some limits on the types of claims that could be
the basis for habeas relief. The new limits had a significant impact on the
practical availability of habeas relief and were subjected to (mostly well
deserved) criticism. But, unlike the limits the Court held were imposed
by AEDPA, the pre-AEDPA limits articulated by the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts were largely consistent with the idea that state prisoners
are entitled to a federal forum for the vindication of their constitutional
rights. Even during this period, the Court’s decisions reflected its view
that federal review of state court decisions resulting in custody was
necessary to protect the constitutional rights of state prisoners and to
ensure that the state courts faithfully applied the Court’s constitutional
precedents.
This section discusses two substantive limitations adopted by the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts and their compatibility with the notion that
state prisoners are entitled to federal court review of constitutional issues
decided against them by the state courts. The two limitations are the
exclusion of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims from the scope
of habeas review and the exclusion of “new” rules not falling into one of
two exceptions.
1. Stone v. Powell and Errors Relating to Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule
In Stone v. Powell, the Court held that habeas relief would be
unavailable for claimed errors by state courts in the application of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule unless the state did not “provid[e] a
full and fair opportunity to litigate” the Fourth Amendment claim in its
courts.”150 The Court thus adopted for habeas claims of Fourth
Amendment error the standard that Professor Bator had advocated for all
claims of constitutional error – a standard akin to that adopted in Williams
150
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for all claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Stone thus appears
to be an exception to the post-Brown rule that habeas is available for de
novo federal review of constitutional issues decided by the state courts
and resulting in custody.
On closer inspection, however, Stone is more a decision about the
Exclusionary Rule than a decision about the scope of habeas corpus
jurisdiction. That is, at any rate, how the majority presented its holding.
The Court stressed that prior decisions had “established that the
[exclusionary] rule is not a personal constitutional right.”151 Rather, it is
“a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect.”152 Given its prophylactic
nature, the Court held, the rule should not be applicable in contexts in
which its benefits are outweighed by its costs. As support for this view,
the Court cited prior decisions limiting the rule’s applicability, such as the
exception permitting the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment for purposes of impeachment153 and the rule’s
“standing” limitation, permitting only the victim of the illegal search to
invoke the exclusionary rule.154 The Court understood these decisions to
establish a “balancing” test under which the exclusionary remedy is
available in a given context only if the rule’s costs are outweighed by its
benefits as a deterrent to Fourth Amendment violations.155
To be sure, the majority’s application of the balancing test relied
on certain assumptions about the reliability of state courts as enforcers of
federal rights that, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, appear to
contradict basic assumptions underlying the Court’s habeas jurisprudence.
In a footnote, the majority noted its confidence in the state courts’ ability
and willingness to enforce federal rights faithfully: “Despite differences in
institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal
constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling
to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to
constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several
States.”156 As Justice Brennan noted, this assumption flies in the face of
prior statements by the Court that “‘habeas serves as a necessary
additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to
conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established
151
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constitutional standards’” and that “the availability of collateral review
assures ‘that the lower federal and state courts toe the constitutional
line.’”157 Since the majority’s confidence in the lower courts extended to
all “constitutional rights,” Justice Brennan feared that the Court’s holding
portended a drastic narrowing of the availability of habeas review
generally, or at least with respect to rules that, in the majority’s words, did
not bear on the defendant’s guilt and hence on “the basic justice of [the
prisoner’s] incarceration.158
In the end, the majority’s assumption about the reliability of state
courts as enforcers of constitutional rights should not have led the court
to conclude that the costs of applying the exclusionary rule on habeas
outweighed the benefits of doing so. The main cost of the exclusionary
rule, according to the majority, was that it “often frees the guilty.”159
Against this cost, the majority weighed the “incremental deterrent effect”
of applying the rule on habeas. If the Court had compared the incremental
costs of applying the rule on habeas with the incremental benefit of doing
so, the Court would have found them to be congruent. This would be so
whether or not one believed that the state courts were reliable enforcers
of federal rights. If the state courts are not reliable enforcers of federal
rights, then the federal courts would be freeing the guilty, but that would
be because the state courts were failing to apply the exclusionary rule
faithfully. On that assumption, application of the rule on habeas would
be necessary as a deterrent. If the state courts are reliable enforcer of the
exclusionary rule, then the federal courts on habeas would not be freeing
the guilty – by hypothesis, the state courts would be doing so. Thus, the
cost of applying the exclusionary rule on habeas would not be very
high.160
Thus, the Court’s cost-benefit analysis was structurally flawed and,
in any event, did not really turn on the court’s footnote assumption that
state courts are reliable enforcers of constitutional rights. The latter
assumption might well have justified a broader narrowing of habeas, but
the majority responded to Justice Brennan’s fear by describing it as
“hyperbole” and by making clear that “[o]ur decision today is not
concerned with the scope of the habeas statute as authority for litigating

157 Id. at 520–21 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1969))(Harlan,
J., dissenting).
158

Id. at 492 n.31.

159

Id. at 490.

160 One might conclude that, if state courts are reliable enforcers of the exclusionary
rule, application of the exclusionary rule on federal habeas is costly from the standpoint of
judicial efficiency, but that is not the sort of cost the Court relied upon in its opinion.
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constitutional claims generally.”161 Indeed, Justice Powell, the author of
Stone, subsequently affirmed his view that “[r]eview on habeas to
determine that the conviction rests upon correct application of the law in
effect at the time of the conviction is . . . required to ‘forc[e] trial and
appellate courts . . . to toe the constitutional mark.’”162
Instead, the majority in Stone made clear that its holding was based
on the idea “that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather
than a personal constitutional right” and on “the minimal utility of the
rule when sought to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims in a habeas
corpus proceeding.”163 Since, as noted, the reasoning that led the Court
to the latter conclusion was fundamentally flawed, the most convincing
explanation of the Court’s holding is that the Court did not regard the
exclusionary rule as a constitutional right. So understood, Stone v. Powell is a
modified application of the established principle, also noted by the
majority, that habeas relief is not available for claimed errors of nonconstitutional federal law unless “the alleged error constituted ‘a
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice.’”164 If so, then Stone v. Powell is not in conflict with the
proposition that state prisoners have a right to de novo review via habeas
corpus of constitutional errors in their state court convictions.
2. Teague v. Lane and “New” Rules of Constitutional Law
The Court adopted another substantive limit on the availability of
habeas review in Teague v. Lane. Teague was framed as a holding regarding
the retroactive applicability of Supreme Court decisions recognizing
“new” rules of constitutional law. At one time, the Court permitted the
articulation of “new” rules of constitutional law by the lower courts on
habeas review, and the new rule was always applied in the case in which it
was articulated. The ‘retroactivity” issue would be addressed in a
subsequent case and would be decided according to a multi-factor test
that did not turn on whether the later case was pending on direct review
at the time of the rule’s articulation or subsequently commenced on
collateral review.165 In Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court held that new rules
161

Id. at 495 n.37.

162 Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 653 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)).
163

Powell, 428 U.S. at 494 n.37.

164 Id. at 465 n.10 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974), which in
turn quoted Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). It is a modified application of
the principle insofar as it leaves open the possibility of federal habeas relief for
exclusionary rule claims if the state did not provide an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of the claim.
165

FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 1295.
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must be applied to all cases pending on direct review at the time the new
rule was announced.166 “[T]he Court's assertion of power to disregard
current law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the
full course of appellate review is quite simply an assertion that our
constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of
legislation.”167
Although Griffith’s reasoning seemed to deny the very concept of a
“new” constitutional rule, in Teague the Court held that new constitutional
rules should generally not be applied on collateral review. In reaching
this decision, the Court endorsed the view that "the threat of habeas
serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts
throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent
with established constitutional standards.”168 But, the Court wrote, “[i]n
order to perform this deterrence function, . . . the habeas court need only
apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original
proceedings took place.”169 For this reason, the Court held, “new”
constitutional rules should ordinarily not be applicable on federal habeas
review.
The Court recognized two exceptions to this non-retroactivity rule.
“First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places ‘certain kinds
of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
law-making authority to proscribe.’”170 The Court subsequently expanded
this category to cover “not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of
certain primary conduct, but also rules prohibiting a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or
offense.”171 The second exception consists of constitutional decisions
recognizing “new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished.”172 The Court in Teague thought it
“unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to

166

479 U.S. 314 (1987).

167

Id. at 323 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971)).

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (plurality opinion)(quoting Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1969)(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
168

169 Id. (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1969)(Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). The Court also quoted and endorsed Justice Powell’s statement from
Stumes, quoted above, to the effect that habeas review is required to force the trial and
appellate courts to “toe the constitutional mark.” Id. (quoting Solum v. Stumes, 465 U.S.
638, 653 (1984), which in turn quoted Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)).
170

Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (1971)).

171

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).

172

Teague, 489 U.S. at 313.
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emerge,”173 and it has yet to find that a new constitutional rule falls in this
category. New rules that fall in either category are applicable retroactively
to prisoners seeking collateral review, but otherwise habeas relief is
available only for claims that the state court violated an “old” rule—i.e.,
one that had been articulated at the time his conviction became final.
In principle at least, the Teague doctrine is consistent with the
proposition that state prisoners are entitled to de novo review of their
constitutional claims. Teague merely tells the habeas court what law they
should apply in performing this de novo review. The state court
proceeding is to be tested against the law in effect at the time of the state
proceeding. Rules articulated by the Supreme Court after those
proceedings are to be disregarded unless they fall within one of the two
exceptions. If the purpose of habeas review is to provide state courts
with an incentive to apply federal law faithfully, this rule makes some
sense. After all, state trial and appellate judges cannot reasonably be
expected to comply with constitutional principles not yet articulated. The
Teague rule also produces, again in principle, a sensible division of
authority as between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.174
Unless the claim falls within one of the two narrow exceptions the Court
recognized, the role of the lower federal courts on habeas is to carry out
the comparatively mundane role of ensuring state-court compliance with
well-established constitutional rules. The Supreme Court, in directly
reviewing state court judgments of conviction, would retain the task of
resolving unsettled questions of federal constitutional law arising in state
criminal cases.
As applied, however, the Teague doctrine has been rightly criticized as
giving state courts an insufficient incentive to apply federal precedents
faithfully.175 The problem has primarily been the Court’s very broad
interpretation of the concept of “new” law. Moreover, the Court’s test
for distinguishing old from new rules blurs the line between de novo and
deferential review of state decisions. The Court determines whether a
claimed rule would be new and hence inapplicable on habeas by asking
whether a reasonable jurist examining the extant precedents would
conclude that the claimed rule was already established.176
In Wright v. West, Justice Thomas (writing for himself and Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia) argued that this test effectively
173

Id.

174

That is, compared to AEDPA as interpreted in Williams.

See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1816–17 (1991).
175

176

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 291 (1992).
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requires the habeas court to defer to the state court’s interpretation of the
then-existing precedents.177 Justice O’Connor (Teague’s author) disagreed:
Teague did not establish a “deferential” standard of review of state
court determinations of federal law. It did not establish a
standard of review at all. Instead, Teague simply requires that a
state conviction on federal habeas be judged according to the law
in existence when the conviction became final. In Teague, we
refused to give state prisoners the retroactive benefit of new rules
of law, but we did not create any deferential standard of review
with regard to old rules.178
Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice O’Connor:
Teague did not establish a deferential standard of review of
state-court decisions of federal law. It established instead a
principle of retroactivity. . . . To be sure, the fact that our
standard for distinguishing old rules from new ones turns on
the reasonableness of a state court’s interpretation of then
existing precedents suggests that federal courts do in one
sense defer to state-court determinations. But we should not
lose sight of the purpose of the reasonableness inquiry where
a Teague issue is raised: The purpose is to determine whether
application of a new rule would upset a conviction that was
obtained in accordance with the constitutional
interpretations existing at the time of the prisoner’s
conviction.179
In sum, Teague retained de novo habeas corpus review for “old” rules.
Although Justice Thomas lost the battle in Wright v. West, he may
have won the war. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy made clear in Wright
that Teague had not mandated deferential review of “old” constitutional
claims on habeas. In Williams, however, these Justices joined Justice
Thomas and the two other Justices who had joined his opinion in
concluding that Congress, in enacting AEDPA, had displaced de novo
review of old claims that had been adjudicated on the merits in state
court, imposing the deferential standard of review that Justice Thomas
had mistakenly believed had been established by Teague.
The Court in Williams did not discuss whether the denial of habeas
relief for wrong but reasonable errors would affect its approach to
177

Id.

178

Id. at 303–04 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)

179

Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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certiorari petitions of persons convicted in state court who would no
longer be able to obtain relief from the lower federal courts on habeas.
As this Essay has shown, state prisoners had always had access to federal
review of errors of federal constitutional law and of mixed questions from
either the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts. Between 1916 and
1953, the responsibility for providing such review shifted from the
Supreme Court to the lower federal courts as the Court came to realize
that it could no longer hope to fulfill an error-correction role. Between
1953 and 1996, the Court cut back on habeas relief in certain respects but
maintained the de novo standard of review in habeas cases, believing that
such review provided “a necessary additional incentive for trial and
appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a
manner consistent with established constitutional standards.”180 If the
Court still believes that such an incentive is necessary, it will need to
rethink its current approach to certiorari petitions by state prisoners
whose access to the habeas relief has been curtailed by AEDPA, as the
Court interpreted the statute in Williams. Just as habeas has always served
a forum-allocation function, Williams may require the Court to understand
AEDPA as a forum allocation rule. The Court will need to consider
whether Congress in enacting AEDPA meant, improbably, to reestablish
the regime for reviewing state court criminal convictions that the Court
emphatically rejected in 1953.181
CONCLUSION
The scope of federal habeas relief available to state prisoners in the
years before Brown v. Allen was decided in 1953 is a famously disputed
question – a question of recognized importance to current debates about
the proper scope of habeas relief. This Essay has shown that the
available scope of habeas relief has always been directly linked to the
effective availability of direct review of state criminal convictions in the
Supreme Court. The need for federal review of issues of constitutional
law and of application of such law to fact decided against criminal
defendants in the state courts has always been recognized. Only the
forum affording such review has changed. Between 1789 and 1916, state
criminal defendants were entitled to review of such issues in the U.S.
Supreme Court. Between 1953 and 1996, de novo review of such issues
was available in the lower federal courts via habeas. The period between
1916 and 1953 was a transitional period marked by disagreement among
the Justices as to the proper federal forum for providing such review. At
first, a majority of the Court continued to regard the Supreme Court as
180 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (plurality opinion)(quoting Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1969)(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
181

I consider this question in Vázquez, supra note 14.
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the proper forum for the sensitive task of reviewing and possibly
reversing state court criminal judgments that had been affirmed by the
highest state courts. Gradually, the Court came to recognize that it could
not hope to fulfill an error-correction function in such cases. The Court
thus made clear in Brown v. Allen both that the Court’s denials of certiorari
petitions filed by state prisoners should not be regarded as reflecting its
views on the merits of the prisoner’s constitutional claims and that the
habeas courts should review de novo the issues of federal constitutional
law and of application of such law to fact decided against the prisoner by
the state courts.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. The number of requests for review filed in the U.S.
Supreme Court between 1916 and 1953 by persons convicted of
crimes in state court.*
YEARS

A

B

C

NUMBER OF
REQUESTS
FOR REVIEW
FILED BY
WRIT OF
ERROR

NUMBER OF
REQUESTS
FOR REVIEW
FILED BY WRIT
OF
CERTIORARI

NUMBER OF
PETITIONS
FOR
CERTIORARI
DENIED

1916

7

1

1

1917

8

3

3

1918

7

3

3

1919

4

2

2

1920

9

3

3

1921

7

2

2

1922

9

2

2

1923

6

3

3

* A search for petitions for writ of error and petitions for writ of certiorari from 19161953 was conducted through the Gale Cengage Learning’s digital collection, The Making of
Modern Law: U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 1832-1978. Following the selection of the
petitions filed by persons convicted of crimes in state court, a search for the decisions by
the U.S. Supreme Court for each of those cases was conducted through the
WestlawNext’s database, U.S. Supreme Court Cases, whose coverage begins in 1790. Each
case was recorded with its filing year, name, citation, type of petition, and decision of the
Court. The number of requests filed by each petition type and the number of petitions in
which the Court denied certiorari for each year were then determined based on the
collected data.
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1924

9

1

1

1925

12

5

5

1926

21

3

3

1927

10

3

3

1928

3

11

11

1929

3

8

8

1930

7

3

3

1931

1

8

7

1932

1

2

1

1933

3

13

9

1934

2

10

7

1935

3

10

8

1936

4

12

11

1937

2

8

7

1938

3

7

6

1939

2

16

11

1940

2

23

20

1941

1

22

18

1942

4

22

18

1943

1

24

22

1944

0

25

22
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1945

2

23

20

1946

3

33

26

1947

2

33

24

1948

1

41

33

1949

0

38

36

1950

0

28

21

1951

0

34

26

1952

0

44

38

1953

2

39

37

